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THE ROLE OF FOLLOW-ON CONTRACTS I N  GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
by 
Edward B. Roberts* and William H. Dyer III+ 
ABSTRACT 
18 new business  R&D con t rac t s  were i n v e s t i g a t e d  f o r  the e f f e c t s  
of cons ide ra t ions  of follow-on p o t e n t i a l  on con t r ac t  performance and 
f o r  t h e  impacts of t h e s e  f a c t o r s  on f u r t h e r  con t r ac t  a c q u i s i t i o n .  
The three dimensions of con t r ac t  performance-schedule, c o s t ,  and 
t e c h n i c a l - - c o r r e l a t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  wi th  each o t h e r ,  and problems i n  
each a rea  c o r r e l a t e  wi th  t h e  growth i n  con t r ac t  c o s t s .  These con- 
t r a c t  problems a r e  g r e a t e s t  i n  t hose  cases  where g r e a t e s t  p o t e n t i a l  
R&D and product ion follow-on was expected a t  t h e  t i m e  of o r i g i n a l  
proposal  prepara t ion .  This suggests  t h a t  companies t h a t  a n t i c i p a t e d  
l a r g e  follow-ons wrote i n t o  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  R&D proposals  promises of 
u n r e a l i s t i c  t ime schedules ,  cos t  estimates and t e c h n i c a l  performance 
goa Is. 
The gene ra l  l i ke l ihood  of R&D follow-ons is  more accu ra t e ly  pre- 
d i c t a b l e  a t  t h e  t ime of o r i g i n a l  proposal  prepara t ion  than i s  t h e  
l i ke l ihood  of production follow-ons. However, except f o r  t h e  t r i v i a l  
ca ses  i n  which it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  no follow-on p o t e n t i a l  e x i s t s ,  defense/  
space marketing men appear unable t o  p r e d i c t  e f f e c t i v e l y  t h e  d o l l a r  
magnitude of t h e  r e s u l t i n g  follow-on con t r ac t s .  
The g r e a t e r  t h e  problems encountered dur ing  con t r ac t  l i f e ,  t h e  l e s s  
t h e  o r i g i n a l  expec ta t ion  of d i r e c t  follow-on from t h e  same government 
agency was r e a l i z e d .  
improvement i n  win r a t i o  i n  t echn ica l ly  r e l a t e d  competi t ions conducted 
by o the r  government agencies .  
However , ) this  was counterbalanced by a marked 
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In t roduct ion  
I n  t h e  defense/aerospace cont rac t ing  bus iness ,  research  and devel-  
opment (R&D) and production "follow-on" c o n t r a c t s  t o  i n i t i a l  R&D con- 
t r a c t s  o f t e n  comprise a l a r g e  port ion of t h e  t y p i c a l  company's t o t a l  
government business .  
plays a v i t a l  r o l e  i n  a company's R&D marketing dec i s ions .  
many R&D c o n t r a c t s  a r e  of an inves t iga to ry  o r  f e a s i b i l i t y  s tudy na tu re ,  
wi th  t h e  expected follow-on being t h e  r e a l  reason f o r  t h e  i n i t i a l  bidding. 
I n  add i t ion ,  t o  s t a y  i n  business a defense/aerospace f i rm must keep up 
wi th  new technologies  and e s t a b l i s h  market p o s i t i o n s  i n  those  t e c h n i c a l  
a r e a s  l i k e l y  t o  grow s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  Y e t  t h e  R&D con t rac t ing  business  
i s  cha rac t e r i zed  by t h e  high cost  of breaking i n t o  a new t echn ica l  a r ea .  
To some ex ten t  t h i s  i s  caused by widespread competi t ive a t tempts  t o  win 
new business  c o n t r a c t s ,  even a t  high c o s t s  t o  t h e  competing companies, 
when l a r g e  follow-on i s  expected. 
a r e  o f t e n  t h e  expected follow-on. 
performing government sponsored research  a r e  s a l a b l e  commodities t o  o t h e r  
government agencies  and, i n  the  form of subcont rac ts ,  t o  indus t ry .  Thus 
the r o l e  of follow-on con t r ac t s  should be of primary concern t o  those  
seeking t o  understand t h e  performance of defense/space companies. 
Consequently cons ide ra t ion  of poss ib l e  "follow-ons" 
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
The rewards f o r  t h e  h igh  e n t r y  c o s t s  
Knowledge and hardware gained through 
Summary of Or ig ina l  New Business Study 
I n  1965 a s tudy was performed by s t a f f  members of t h e  M.I.T. 
Research Program on t h e  Management of Science and Technology t o  inves- 
t i g a t e  success fu l  marketing s t r a t e g i e s  i n  r e sea rch  and development con- 
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. 
tracting.' 
plied data on a total of 121 of their most recent competitive situations 
that met the following sampling criteria: 
During the research effort nine cooperating companies sup- 
1) R&D Research and/or development was the primary purpose of the 
contract. 
2) New Business The procurement would not be included if it in- 
volved a direct follow-on or contract extension to contracts already 
held by the company. 
3 )  $100,000 or Greater in Bid Price The actual bids ranged from 
$100,000 up to $10,500,000. 
4 )  Prime Contract from a Federal Government Agency Subcontracts 
were excluded from the sample. 
5 )  Competitive Procurement A procurement was included if the RFP 
was sent to at least two companies, regardless of the number submitting 
bids. 
6) Contract Awarded Pending and cancelled procurements were 
excluded. 
It was the intent to collect information on about twenty-five contracts 
from each company. Unfortunately, far fewer suitable contracts were 
'For a full description of the procurements and companies involved, see 
Kneissler, Norman W., An Investigation of Marketing Strategies in the 
Government RbJ> Industry, and Ramsaier, L. Mark, Performance Measures 
and Marketing Strategies in Research and Development, unpublished S.M. 
theses, M.I.T., February, 1966. Copies of either may be purchased from 
the M.I.T. Microreproduction Service in Microfilm or Xerox form. 
brief summary of the above studies was presented by Edward B. Roberts 
at the Boston College Conference on Marketing in the Defense Industry, 
May 19, 1966, and later published as M.I.T. Working Paper t235-66, The 
Measurement and Improvement of R&D Marketing Effectiveness, January, 1967. 
A 
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Company 
Number Won 
Number L o s t  
Tota 1 
a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  companies s tudied.  Table 1 shows t h e  a c t u a l  number of 
competit ive s i t u a t i o n s  t h a t  met t h e  c r i t e r i a .  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  T o t a l  
2 1  1 0 0 1  7 2 3 1 6  
- 
100 15 10 12 9 4 17 13 17 3 
12 1 22 12  15 10 10 18 13 17 4 
Table 1. Disposi t ion of t h e  Awards by Company 
I 
I n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s tudy only one ques t ion  was asked of t h e  companies 
t h a t  d i r e c t l y  t r e a t e d  expectat ions of follow-on c o n t r a c t s .  It sought 
information on t h e  poss ib l e  impact of follow-on cons ide ra t ions  on t h e  
proposal a s  w e l l  a s  e s t ima tes  of poss ib l e  R&D and production follow-on. 
The ques t ionna i r e  inquired:  
A t  t h e  t i m e  t h e  dec i s ion  was made t o  bid,  d i d  you p a r t i c u l a r l y  
concern your se l f  with p o t e n t i a l  follow-on which might r e s u l t  from 
t h i s  procurement? Yes No- 
I f  y e s ,  what was t h e  t o t a l  d o l l a r  volume of R and D follow-on 
expected from t h i s  procurement i n  t h e  f i v e  yea r s  following re- 
ceipt of  t h e  RFP? 
(a) From t h i s  customer: $ ? 
(b) From o t h e r  government agencies:  $ ? 
What was t h e  t o t a l  d o l l a r  volume of product ion follow-on expected 
from t h i s  procurement i n  t h e  f i v e  yea r s  following r e c e i p t  of t h e  
RFP? 
(a )  From t h i s  customer: $ ? 
(b) From o t h e r  government agencies:  $ ? 
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Ramsaier2 found no s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between follow-on seeke r s  
and c o n t r a c t  winners (Table 2).  
Table 2. E f fec t  of Expected Follow-on on I n i t i a l  Awards 
Concerned with 
Fo 1 low-on Percent Won 3 Sign i f i cance  Level 
Yes 
No 
17.6 68 
17.5 51 
.45 
This t a b l e  i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  17.6% of t h e  68 proposal 
teams who were concerned with p o t e n t i a l  follow-on won c o n t r a c t s .  A 
s i m i l a r  percent (17.5%) of the 51 "No" answers also won c o n t r a c t s .  
I n  f u r t h e r  analyzing t h e  o r i g i n a l  d a t a ,  Dyer has  found a number of 
conclusions concerning follow-ons: 
(1) The mean of t h e  R&D follow-on expected by winners i s  s t a t i s -  
t i c a l l y  higher  than t h e  mean of t h e  l o s e r s  
Mean expected R&D follow-on, winners = $23,440 
Mean expected R&D follow-on, l o s e r s  = $ 3,372 
(T-test, 1 - t a i l  p r o b a b i l i t y  =I .003)3 
This  f a c t  should be tempered by t h e  knowledge t h a t  t h e  da t a  were c o l l e c t e d  
a f t e r  t h e  c o n t r a c t s  were awarded and t h e  winners would know more about 
t h e  agency's plans than  t h e  losers. 
(2) Companies p l ace  a higher  p r i o r i t y  on c o n t r a c t s  w i th  expected 
follow-ons i n  t h a t  they a re  more l i k e l y  i n  those cases  t o  e s t a b l i s h  tech- 
n i c a l  con tac t  with t h e  customer p r i o r  t o  RFP r e c e i p t  (p - .07). 
2Ramsaier, op. c i t . ,  p. 28. 
3Rather than be r e p e t i t i v e  from t h i s  po in t  on, a11 reported p robab i l i -  
t i e s  w i l l  be f o r  o n e - t a i l  tests.  Thus a T-test which determined a 
o n e - t a i l  p r o b a b i l i t y  of .003 w i l l  be shown a s  (T-test, p = .003). 
0 
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(3) Those proposal teams without previous experience with t h e  cus- 
tomer's  t e c h n i c a l  i n i t i a t o r  o r  h i s  group were more l i k e l y  t o  b id  on con- 
t r a c t s  i f  t h e r e  was expected follow-on (R&D, T-test ,  p = .08; Production, 
T-test, p = .14). It would appear t h a t  companies who r ece ive  a n  RFP 
without knowing t h e  t e c h n i c a l  i n i t i a t o r  f e e l  they a r e  a t  a disadvantage.  
I n  t h e s e  s i t u a t i o n s  they mainly go a f t e r  t hose  c o n t r a c t s  t h a t  w i l l  g ive  
them e n t r y  t o  new t e c h n i c a l  a r eas  t h a t  have good p o t e n t i a l  f o r  l a t e r  
government R&D and production follow-on business .  
These conclusions i n i t i a t e d  our i n t e r e s t  i n  examining follow-ons, speci-  
f i c a l l y  wi th  t h e  twenty-one winning con t r ac t  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  our o r i g i n a l  
study. 
The Follow-on Study 
I n  August, 1966, a quest ionnaire  was s e n t  t o  each of t h e  21 re- 
spondents of t h e  o r i g i n a l  winning proposals w i t h  t h e  purpose of learn-  
i n g  how t h e  o r i g i n a l  expectat ions r e l a t e  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  p r o j e c t  h i s t o r y  
and follow-on (so f a r  and now expected), and how t h e  bid-no-bid dec i s ions  
and r e s u l t s  w i t h i n  t h e  same t echn ica l  a r e a  have proceeded i n  t h e  yea r  
and one-half s i n c e  t h e  awards. Eighteen ques t ionna i r e s  were r e tu rned  
f u l l y  completed with two incomplete r e t u r n s  and one non-response ( the 
l a t t e r  from Company 9 which only bid on fou r  procurements meeting t h e  
c r i t e r i a  during t h e  o r i g i n a l  t e s t  per iod) .  For t h e  most p a r t  t h e  re- 
mainder of t h i s  paper t r e a t s  the analyses  of t h e  eighteen completed ques- 
t i o n n a i r e s  from s i x  d i f f e r e n t  companies. 
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. The ques t ionna i r e  con ta ins  two broad d i v i s i o n s :  t h e  f i r s t  is con- 
cerned wi th  t h e  performance achieved on t h e  o r i g i n a l  R&D con t rac t  and t h e  
second a sks  quest ions about con t r ac t  follow-ons received up t o  t h e  d a t e  
of ques t ionna i r e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  (August, 1966) and follow-ons now expected 
from t h e  o r i g i n a l  c o n t r a c t .  
Performance on t h e  Or ig ina l  Contracts  
Fourteen of t h e  c o n t r a c t s  were completed a s  of ques t ionna i r e  response,  
w i th  t h e  o the r  four  es t imated a t  more than 90% complete. 
t h e  eighteen con t r ac t  s i t u a t i o n s  r e s u l t e d  i n  d o l l a r  growth ranging from 
$1000 t o  $694,000 while t h e  remaining n ine  received only t h e  award p r i c e  
(Table 3). 
One-half of 
The growth tended t o  be found i n  t h e  l a r g e r  d o l l a r  volume c o n t r a c t s  
( con t r ac t s  f o r  over $300,000). The growth s l i g h t l y  c o r r e l a t e d  with t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  o r i g i n a l  bid and t h e  negot ia ted award p r i c e ,  a l -  
though s u r p r i s i n g l y  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  was not  s i g n i f i c a n t  (p = .34). 
Growth was not a func t ion  of con t r ac t  type a s  t h e  average growth per 
c o n t r a c t  was about equal f o r  the e igh t  f i x e d  p r i c e  and 10 cost-plus  con- 
t r a c t s  i n  t h e  sample. Many of t h e  non-responses i n  t h e  p r o f i t  columns 
a re  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  f ixed  p r i c e  con t r ac t s .  This problem and t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  four  c o n t r a c t s  were not complete suggested t h a t  no s t a t i s t i c a l  tes ts  
be performed on t h e  p r o f i t  data .  B u t  t h e s e  da t a  a r e  presented i n  Table 3 
f o r  t h e  r eade r  t o  draw h i s  own conclusions.  
The managers of t he  p r o j e c t s  had had p r i o r  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o  t h e i r  
j obs ,  s e rv ing  i n  a l l  but one case a s  head of t h e  proposal team. Even 
t h e  manager of t h e  s i n g l e  exception had been a c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  t h e  pro- 
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posal e f f o r t .  
found by Rubin and Marquis i n  a s tudy of fo r ty -e igh t  government sponsored 
R&D  project^.^ 
occurred during t h e  p r o j e c t s .  
This background of t h e  manager ag rees  with t h e  r e s u l t s  
Despite t h e  p ro jec t  managers' experiences,  many changes 
I n  one-third of t h e  con t r ac t s  t e c h n i c a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  were s i g n i -  
f i c a n t l y  a l t e r e d  during t h e  l i f e  of t h e  c o n t r a c t ,  two r e q u i r i n g  no t i m e  
extension.  I n  one case  s i g n i f i c a n t  changes i n  t h e  program d i r e c t i o n  were 
informally agreed upon t o  resolve d i f f e r e n c e s  of  opinion between t h e  two- 
government t e c h n i c a l  monitors. I n  o t h e r  cases  increased work and new know- 
ledge gained e x t e r n a l  t o  t h e  con t r ac t  were c i t e d  a s  change agents .  
Only two c o n t r a c t  s i t u a t i o n s  ind ica t ed  t e c h n i c a l  problems a s  t h e  
reason f o r  t i m e  extensions,  w h i l e  t h e  rest gave t h e  customer's expansion 
o f  con t r ac t  o b j e c t i v e s  a s  t h e  cause. 
I n  o rde r  t o  h e l p  us a s ses s  t h e  na tu re  of  d i f f i c u l t i e s  encountered 
during t h e  p r o j e c t  t h e  respondents were asked t o  r a t e  on a f ive -po in t  
s c a l e  t h e  ex ten t  of problems encountered i n  the t h r e e  a r e a s  of schedule,  
c o s t  and t e c h n i c a l  performance. 
Table 4. 
The r e s u l t i n g  da ta  a r e  displayed i n  
The t h r e e  con t r ac t  performance measures l i s t e d  i n  Table 4 c o r r e l a t e  
h igh ly  with each o the r .  A non-parametric (Kendall Tau) i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n  
s t a t i s t i c  was ca l cu la t ed  f o r  each of t h e  t h r e e  poss ib l e  p a i r s .  These r e -  
l a t i o n s h i p  i n d i c e s  a r e  shown i n  Table 5 with t h e  corresponding p r o b a b i l i t y  
t h a t  such a va lue  of Tau could occur randomly. 
'Rubin, Irwin M. and Donald G .  
t i o n  of Development P ro jec t s ,  
p. 13. 
Marquis, C r i t i c a l  Decisions i n  t h e  I n i t i a -  
M.I.T. Working Paper #192-66, June, 1966, 
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Table 4. Contract Performance Ratings+ 
Contract 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
M 
N 
0 
P 
Q 
R 
Schedule 
Pro b lems 
1 
4 
1 
3 
4 
5 
4 
4 
4 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
c o s t  
Problems 
1 
2 
4 
3 
4 
5 
3 
4 
5 
1 
1 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
Technica 1 
Problems 
3 
2 
2 
1 
5 
4 
3 
5 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
+ T h e  h ighe r  t h e  r a t i n g ,  t h e  more s e r i o u s  t h e  problem 
(e .g . ,  1 = problems not s i g n i f i c a n t ;  5 = problems were c r u c i a l )  
Table 5. Relat ionships  among Contract Problems and Contract Cost Growth 
Tau, p a r t i a l  
P r o b a b i l i t y  c o r r e l a t i o n s  Tau -
Schedu le-Cos t .510 
Schedule-Technica 1 .364 
Cost -Technical .300 
Schedule-Growth .228 
Cost-Growth .496 
Technical-Growth ,186 
.009 
.044 
.088 
.165 
.010 
.195 
- .047 
.445 
.055 
The t h r e e  measures were a l s o  co r re l a t edwi th  t h e  t o t a l  growth i n  t h e  
d o l l a r s  received from t h e  con t r ac t  (from Table 3). 
growth c o r r e l a t e d  most h igh ly  with cos t  problems. I n  f a c t ,  because of 
t h e  interdependences among t h e  va r ious  performance measures, they were 
As expected, con t r ac t  
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each c o r r e l a t e d  with con t r ac t  growth wi th  t h e  o t h e r  measures p a r t i a l e d  
out ( i .e . ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  of v a r i a t i o n  by t h e  t h i r d  and fou r th  v a r i a b l e s  
upon t h e  r e l a t i o n  between t h e  two v a r i a b l e s  a r e  e l imina ted ) .  The Tau 
va lues  f o r  t h e  p a r t i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n s ,  a s  l i s t e d  i n  Table 5 ,  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  
con t r ac t  growth c o r r e l a t e s  t r u l y  only wi th  cos t  problems. 
When asked t o  explain t h e  n a t u r e  of t hose  problems r a t e d  a s  above 
average i n  se r iousness ,  respondents i nd ica t ed  t h a t  cos t  and schedule 
problems seemed t o  occur most f r equen t ly  when t h e  t e c h n i c a l  s p e c i f i c a -  
t i o n s  were a l t e r e d  without adequate changes i n  t h e  d e l i v e r y  d a t e  o r  money 
awarded. One respondent f o r  a c o n t r a c t  t h a t  achieved low t e c h n i c a l  per- 
formance ind ica t ed  t h a t  t h e  con t r ac t  was e s s e n t i a l  t o  h e l p  h i s  organiza- 
t i o n  cap tu re  a much l a r g e r  development follow-on c o n t r a c t  which t h e  com- 
pany subsequently l o s t .  
The P r e d i c t a b i l i t y  of Direct  Follow-on 
I n  Table 6 t h e  d i r e c t  follow-on d o l l a r s  received and expected a r e  
compared t o  t h e  amounts expected approximately a t  t h e  time t h e  o r i g i n a l  
R&D c o n t r a c t  was awarded. 
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Table 6. Direct Follow-on to R&D Contracts 
($000) 
R6J) Follow-on Production Follow-on 
Or igina 1 ly 
Expected 
0 
5000 
0 
0 
200000 
50000 
0 
0 
200000 
0 
1500 
1000 
800 
0 
0 
0 
500 
Rec e ive d 
So far 
0 
1500 
0 
0 
30 
0 
0 
0 
3 60 
26116 
373 
49 
320 
0 
395 
5 20 
100 
Now 
Expected 
0 
3 000 
20000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
23500 
0 
1000 
100 
0 
0 
500 
500 
500 
Originally 
Expected 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
50000 
500 
350 
50000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Received 
So Far 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
150 
0 
0 
0 
0 
30 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Now 
Expected 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
150 
150 
0 
0 
0 
100 
0 
0 
0 
500 
0 
If the magnitude of the dollar volume is neglected and follow-on is 
momentarily considered as a something-or-nothing variable, the following 
four contingency tables can be set up. 
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Expected 
No Follow-on 
Expected 
Some Follow-on 
Totals 
. 
Re c e ived Received 
No Follow-on Some Follow-on Totals 
7 3 10 
1 7 8 
8 10 18 
Table 7 R&D Follow-on, Originally Expected vs . Received* 
~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ 
*Fisher Exact, p = .02 
Table 8. R&D Follow-on, Originally Expected vs. Present Expectations+ 
Initially 
Exp e c t e d 
No Follow-on 
Initially 
Expected 
Some Follow-on 
Totals 
Now Expect 
No Follow-on 
7 
3 
10 
Now Expect 
Some Follow-on 
3 
Totals 
10 
8 
18 
?Fisher Exact, p = .I4 
Re c e ived Received I 
I 1  
16 2 18 
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Table 9 .  Production Follow-on, Originally Expected vs. Received $ 
No Follow-on Some Follow-on Tota Is 
Expected 
No Follow-on 13 1 I 
Expected 
Some Follow-on 
Tota 1s 
* Fisher Exact, p = .37 
Table 10. Production Follow-on, Originally Expected 
vs. Present Expectat ions**.. . 
Tota 1s 
Now Expect 
No Follow-on 
Now Expect 
Some Follow-on 
Ini t ia lly 
Expected 
No Follow-on 
2 12  
2 
14 
14 
. 4  
Initially 
Expected Some 
Fo 1 low-on 
2 
4 18 
*Fisher Exact, p = .16 
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The high s t a t i s t i c a l  s ign i f i cance  of t h e  c o n t r a s t i n g  da ta  a r r ayed  
i n  Table 7 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  R&D marketing men a r e  f a i r l y  good a t  p r e d i c t -  
i ng  whether any R&D follow-on (without regard t o  amount) w i l l  r e s u l t  
w i t h i n  two yea r s .  Their  a b i l i t y  a t  longer range p red ic t ion ,  however, i s  
not a s  good, a s  can be seen i n  Table 8 .  The r e s u l t s  suggest t h a t  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  p r e d i c t o r s  of follow-on a re  s t i l l  gene ra l ly  o p t i m i s t i c  about 
t h e i r  f u t u r e  prospects  (neglect ing d o l l a r  volume cons ide ra t ions ) ,  and 
they a r e  reasonably cons i s t en t  with t h e i r  e a r l i e r  f o r e c a s t s .  Tables 9 
and 10 and t h e i r  corresponding less s i g n i f i c a n t  p r o b a b i l i t y  l e v e l s  fn- 
d i c a t e  low p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  by R&D competitors of p o s s i b l e  production ou t -  
comes of t h e i r  work. Thus w e  can say wi th  a reasonable  degree of con- 
f idence  t h a t  t h e  marketing men cannot p r e d i c t  production follow-ons a t  
t h e  t i m e  of  R&D proposal submission. 
production follow-ons should not be weighted h e a v i l y  when f i x i n g  a bid 
p r i c e  i n  a n  R&D competit ion.  
This f i n d i n g  suggests  t h a t  poss ib l e  
The au tho r s  f e e l  t h a t  t h e  d o l l a r  magnitude e s t ima tes  provided i n  t h e  
ques t ionna i r e  responses f o r  expected follow-ons merely r ep resen t  o rde r s  
of magnitude and should not be regarded a s  exact  i n t e r v a l  numbers ( i .e . ,  
parametr ic  tes ts  a r e  not  j u s t i f i e d ) .  Therefore,  rank-order c o r r e l a t i o n s  
have been performed on the o r i g i n a l  expec ta t ions  a g a i n s t  t h e  follow-on 
money received so f a r  and t h a t  now expected. 
Tau test was employed i n  t h e s e  analyses . )  
(The non-parametric Kendall 
I f  a l l  t h e  da t a  of Table 6 a re  used ( i .e. ,  a l l  e ighteen c o n t r a c t  
s i t u a t i o n s ) ,  t h e  o r i g i n a l  R&D follow-on expec ta t ions  a r e  discovered t o  
be  s t r o n g l y  c o r r e l a t e d  with t h a t  received so f a r  (Tau = .34 ,  p = .07).  
I n  a d d i t i o n  o r i g i n a l  expectat ions a r e  c l o s e l y  matched by cu r ren t  expecta- 
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t i o n s  of R&D follow-ons (Tau = .33 ,  p = .09). However, i t  was f e l t  t h a t  
even t h e  l e a s t  experienced marketing man could t e l l  from t h e  na tu re  of 
c e r t a i n  c o n t r a c t s  t h a t  they would not involve follow-ons. On t h i s  b a s i s  
s ix  c o n t r a c t  s i t u a t i o n s  were el iminated i n  which: (1) follow-on expecta- 
t i o n s  were $0 o r i g i n a l l y ,  (2) $0 has been received s o  f a r ,  and (3) $0 
i s  now expected t o  be received i n  t h e  f u t u r e  (see Table 6 f o r  t h e s e  d a t a ) .  
The remaining con t r ac t  s i t u a t i o n s  a r e  concerned i n  some way with 
follow-ons. Here t h e  a n a l y s i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  i n  n o n t r i v i a l  cases  t h e  
marketing people know l i t t l e  about t h e  magnitude of  expected follow-ons. 
When t h e  o r i g i n a l  R&D follow-on expectat ions a r e  c o r r e l a t e d  with t h e  follow- 
on amount received s o  f a r ,  the  r e s u l t a n t  s t a t i s t i c  (Tau = :250, p = .33)  
i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  expectat ions i n  t h e s e  twelve con t r ac t  s i t u a -  
t i o n s  were g r o s s l y  wrong, even a s  t o  t h e  o rde r  of magnitude of t h e  ex- 
pected r e sea rch  and development follow-ons. I f  we consider  t h e  sum of t h e  
present  expec ta t ion  of f u t u r e  R&D follow-on (remembering t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
c o n t r a c t s  a r e  for t h e  most pa r t  completed) p lus  t h e  money received so f a r  
a s  our  bes t  estimate of t o t a l  R&D follow-ons, we f i n d  t h a t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
estimates c o r r e l a t e  even more nega t ive ly  (Tau = -.272, p = ,118). 
It i s  of no te  t h a t  R&D marketing people do not seem t o  base present  
expectat ions on money received s o  f a r  ( i n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  of 
Tau = .05l). Y e t  each c o r r e l a t e s  highly (and t o  t h e  same ex ten t )  with 
t h e  sum of t h e  two, i . e . ,  present  a c t u a l  p lus  f u t u r e  expected follow-on 
(Tau = .504 and Tau = .469, r e s p e c t i v e l y ) .  
The c o r r e l a t i o n  of o r i g i n a l  expec ta t ion  of production follow-ons wi th  
Although t h e  corresponding a c t u a l  and now expected i s  even more negat ive.  
only s i x  con t r ac t  s i t u a t i o n s  were a f f e c t e d  by n o n t r i v i a l  production follow- 
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on cons ide ra t ions ,  t h e  company t h a t  o r i g i n a l l y  expected a $500,000,000 
production con t r ac t  must have made bid dec i s ions  d i f f e r e n t  from what i t  
would have done i f  i t  had expected $0.00, which it does now! 
Follow-on Expectations vs .  P ro jec t  Performance 
It i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  expectat ions of l a r g e  follow-on c o n t r a c t s  may 
have l e d  t h e  companies i n t o  making f a r  t o o  o p t i m i s t i c  performance pro- 
mises i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  R&D con t r ac t  proposals.  
augur problems i n  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  p r o j e c t s .  We s h a l l  now look a t  t h e  r e l a -  
t i o n s h i p s  of t h e  var ious measures of performance on t h e  o r i g i n a l  R&D con- 
t r a c t  t o  t h e  o r i g i n a l  expectat ions of follow-on. 
Such promises would then 
In  t h e  ques t ionna i r e  t h e  companies r a t e d  on a f i v e  point  s c a l e  t h e  
e x t e n t  of  problems encountered i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  E D  c o n t r a c t  i n  t h e  t h r e e  
a r e a s  of schedule,  c o s t ,  and t echn ica l  performance (Table 4 ) .  A r a t i n g  
of one ind ica t ed  t h a t  t h e  problems were not  s i g n i f i c a n t  while  a f i v e  
meant t h e  problems were c r u c i a l  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t .  
We f i r s t  looked a t  t h e  rank-order c o r r e l a t i o n  of t h e  t h r e e  pe r fo r -  
mance measures and t h e  o r i g i n a l  expec ta t ions  f o r  R&D and production follow-onsn 
Table 11. Follow-on Expectations and Performance Problems 
Problem Measure vs .  Or ig ina l  Follow-on Expectations P r o b a b i l i t y  
Schedule Problems vs. R&D Follow-on Expected .422 .032 
Cost Problems vs. E D  Follow-on Expected .276 . lo8  
Technical Problems vs. R&D Follow-on Expected 255 .147 
Schedule Problems VS. Production Follow-on Expected .589  .029 
Cost Problems VS. Production Follow-on Expected .554 .034 
Technical Problems vs. Production Follow-on Expected .531 .037 
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Examining t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n  of the pa i r ed  v a r i a b l e s  with t h e  o t h e r s  p a r t i a l l e d  
out r e v e a l s  t h a t  a l l  t h e  above r e l a t i o n s  a r e  indeed c o r r e l a t e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  
Based on t h e s e  s t a t i s t i c a l  evidences we can conclude t h a t  t hose  companies 
t h a t  expect l a r g e  follow-ons submit i n i t i a l  proposals with u n r e a l i s t i c  
t i m e  schedules,  cos t  estimates, and t e c h n i c a l  performance goa l s  i n  o r d e r  
t o  capture  t h e  i n i t i a l  R&D award. These ove rop t imis t i c  promises then i n -  
duce s e r i o u s  problems during the a c t u a l  p r o j e c t  durat ion.  
Because both R&D follow-on amounts received so f a r  and the  R&D money 
now expected c o r r e l a t e  so w e l l  w i th  t h e  sum of t h e s e  two follow-on f i g u r e s ,  
it was decided t o  use t h i s  sum ( i . e . ,  money received so f a r  p lus  d o l l a r s  
now expected) a s  a proxy f o r  a c t u a l  eventual  t o t a l  follow-on. The com- 
panies  were divided i n t o  those i d e n t i f y i n g  a s e r i o u s  performanc'e problem 
( r a t i n g  of four  o r  more) and those with less s e r i o u s  problems ( i . e . ,  t h r e e  
or less). To remove t h e  scope of t h e  c o n t r a c t  as  a major i n f luenc ing  
parameter, w e  used t h e  a lgeb ra i c  d i f f e r e n c e  ( i . e . ,  + o r  - ) of t h e  o r i g i -  
n a l  expected follow-on less the sum c a l c u l a t e d  above. The r e s u l t s  s p l i t  
on t h e  se r iousness  of scheduling problems a r e  shown i n  Table 12 .  
Table 1 2 .  Schedule Problems and Changes i n  Expected R&D Follow-On 
(Changes shown i n  thousands of d o l l a r s )  
Problems r a t e d  4 o r  more 
+500 
+199,970 
+50,000 
0 
0 
+17 6,000 
Problems r a t e d  3 o r  less 
-20,000 +500 
0 0 
-26,116 -900 
+loo 0 
+850 - 1000 
0 - 100 
A +500 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  one company which r a t e d  schedule problems a s  
high a s  4 on t h e  s c a l e  o r i g i n a l l y  expected $500,000 more follow-on than 
it  now expects  ( including t h a t  a l r eady  r ece ived) .  
1 -  
I 
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Again w e  t r e a t  t h e  numeric follow-on sums as  i n d i c a t i v e  only of 
order  of magnitude and the re fo re  use  a nonparametric t e s t  t o  avoid t h e  
assumption of i n t e r v a l  da t a .  
have been drawn from t h e  same populat ion,  w e  apply t h e  Mann-Whitney U 
t e s t . 5  For schedule problems and R&D follow-on t h e  ca l cu la t ed  U i s  11 
with p = .009. With t h i s  small amount l e f t  t o  chance, t h e  r e sea rche r s  
conclude t h a t  s e r i o u s  schedule problems s t a t i s t i c a l l y  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  l o s s  
of expected R&D d o l l a r s .  A s i m i l a r  a n a l y s i s  of t h e  schedule  problems' 
e f f e c t  on loss of o r i g i n a l l y  expected product ion follow-on r e s u l t e d  i n  
a U = 10, p - .007. (The d i r e c t i o n  of e f f e c t  is  obtained from inspec- 
t i o n  of t h e  data . )  Again w e  conclude t h a t  schedule  problems d e l e t e r i -  
ous ly  a f f e c t  product ion cont rac t  follow-ons. 
To test  whether t h e  two independent groups 
I n  l i k e  manner both cos t  problems and t e c h n i c a l  performance d i f f i -  
c u l t i e s  were used t o  s p l i t  the con t r ac t  s i t u a t i o n s  i n t o  comparative 
groups. For both measures of performance, problems r e s u l t  i n  lowered 
c o n t r a c t  follow-ons. The d e t a i l e d  r e s u l t s  w i l l  be summarized i n  Table  16. 
Cont rac ts  i n  t h e  Same Technical Area 
It was necessary t o  p ro tec t  a g a i n s t  double counting of follow-ons 
o r  c o n t r a c t s  won i n  t h e  given t e c h n i c a l  a r e a s .  
t h a t  t w o  o r  more o r i g i n a l  con t r ac t  awards t o  me company d e a l t  with 
s i m i l a r  technology and that  the follow-on awards a t t r i b u t e d  t o  both 
would lead t o  double counting. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y  e x i s t e d  
I n  order  t o  i n s u r e  a g a i n s t  such a n  
SSiegel ,  Sidney, Nonparametric S t a t i s t i c s  f o r  t h e  Behavioral  Sciences 
New York: McGraw-Hi11 Book Company, 1956), p. 116. 
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. occurrence,  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  a r eas  of t h e  c o n t r a c t s  were examined a s  w e l l  a s  
t h e  follow-ons and c o n t r a c t s  t o  o t h e r  agencies .  
t h e  t e c h n i c a l  a r e a s  t h e  same f o r  two c o n t r a c t s  and t h e  company expected 
and rece ived  nothing i n  both cases .  
Only f o r  company 2 were 
I n  t h e  two years  s i n c e  the  o r i g i n a l  awards were made, t h e r e  have 
been f i f ty - two  procurements conducted i n  t h e  remaining s i x t e e n  t e c h n i c a l  
a r e a s  represented .  
Table 13. Contract  Oppor tuni t ies  i n  t h e  Same Technical  Area 
Number of follow-on procurements conducted? R&D 51 
Production 2 
T o t a l  52 
Number of sole-source awards t o  you? 18 
Number of compet i t ive proposals?  30 Won? 22 
Number u n s o l i c i t e d  proposals submitted? 2 Won? 4 
In some cases  awards a r e  s t i l l  pending. Taking a l l  companies to -  
ge ther ,  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  experience gained through t h e  i n i t i a l  con t r ac t  ce r -  
t a i n l y  has  been u t i l i z e d  by o t h e r  agencies  (or  i ndus t ry ) .  Forty-four  
follow-on o r  r e l a t e d  con t r ac t s  were awarded t o  t h e  s i x  companies f o r  a 
t o t a l  va lue  exceeding $28,000,000. 
The companies were asked t o  breakdown t h e i r  bidding i n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  
a r ea  by agency. Agency 1 (in Table  14) r ep resen t s  an  aggregat ion of t h e  
ones each company considered most important i n  u t i l i z i n g  t h e  technology. 
Agencies 2 and 3 a r e  aggregates  of t h e  companies' second and t h i r d  most 
c i t e d  government organiza t ions .  
t o  bidding a c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  same t e c h n i c a l  a r ea ,  s ix  l e d  t o  b ids  submitted 
t o  two or more agencies ,  and two l ed  t o  bidding t o  more than  t h r e e  agen- 
c i e s .  
Twelve o r i g i n a l  con t r ac t  s i t u a t i o n s  led  
On t h e  average each of t h e  o r i g i n a l  18 c o n t r a c t s  s tud ied  has  l ed  
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t o  company b ids  i n  about t h ree  follow-on procurements. An a l t e r n a t e  view 
i s  t h a t  t h e  12 o r i g i n a l  probable nominees f o r  follow-on have each produced 
about four  follow-on oppor tun i t i e s .  
Table 14. Breakdown of Bids i n  Same Technical  Area by Government Agency 
No. of Procurements Agency 1 Agency 2 Agency 3 A l l  o t h e r  T o t a l  
Bid 27 16 6 3 52 
No bid  2 1 3 0 6 
Won 22 11 5 3 41 
Lost 4 2 0 0 6 
Not y e t  awarded 1 3 1 0 5 
Procurement Do l l a r s  
( in  $000) 
Won 27,000 410 156 4 28,170 
Bid but l o s t  3,360 110 0 0 3,470 
Bid but no award 65 ? ? 0 6 5+ 
The f a c t  t h a t  only one production con t r ac t  has  been let  wi th in  two 
yea r s  a f t e r  t h e  18 new business R&D con t r ac t  awards may suggest how few 
R&D jobs r e s u l t  i n  production oppor tun i t i e s .  It a l s o  may i n d i c a t e  t h e  
t i m e  delays between i n i t i a l  funding of R&D p r o j e c t s  and t h e  use  of t h e  
technology gained f o r  production items. (Perhaps another  s tudy  i s  j u s t i -  
f i e d  i n  a few more yea r s  t o  examine product ion follow-on obtained by then . )  
The d o l l a r s  won and l o s t ,  a s  shown i n  t h e  bottom h a l f  of Table 14, may be 
somewhat misleading i n  t h a t  one con t r ac t  win of $26,000,000 and one loss 
of $3,000,000 dominate t h e  t o t a l s .  
about d o l l a r s  won, lost, and b id  but not awarded were poor i n  some cases  
so t h a t  t h e  numeric cap tu re  r a t i o  (number of c o n t r a c t s  wonhumber of con- 
t r a c t s  awarded) i s  f o r  t h i s  study a more a c c u r a t e  measure of competi t ive 
success  than a w i d l o s s  d o l l a r  r a t i o .  
The response da ta  on t h e  ques t ion  
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The numeric capture  r a t io  of 41/47 = 87% of r e l a t e d  "follow-on" com- 
p e t i t i o n s  demonstrates t h e  value of winning a n  i n i t i a l  con t r ac t  t o  ga in  
work experience and poss ib ly  a r e p u t a t i o n  i n  a given t e c h n i c a l  a r ea .  
assuming eventua l  loss of the f i v e  awards s t i l l  not  announced produces a 
win r a t i o  of 41/52 = 79%. 
was 21/121 = 17%. 
companies t h a t  were not included i n  t h i s  follow-on a n a l y s i s  g ives  a r a t i o  
i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  s tudy of only 20/87 - 23%. 
sen t  sample have t h e  fol lowing capture  r a t i o s :  
Even 
The numeric cap tu re  r a t i o  of t h e  o r i g i n a l  s tudy 
Even e l imina t ing  from t h e  o r i g i n a l  s tudy da ta  t h e  t h r e e  
The s i x  companies i n  t h e  pre-  
Table 15. Numeric Capture Ratios* 
(number of con t r ac t s  won/number of c o n t r a c t s  awarded) 
1 2 2 4 5 5 Mean - -  
Orig ina l  cqpture  r a t i o  ( X )  32 16 20 10 60 5 23 
Follow-on capture  r a t i o  (Z) 89 0 80 78 91 100 87 
%fann-Whitney U = 16,  p - .OS 
L 
Thus only company 2 has not y e t  gained i n  o v e r a l l  compet i t ive e f f e c t i v e -  
ness from t h e  government-sponsored research  performed dur ing  i t s  o r i g i n a l  
con t r ac t .  I n  t h a t  case  t h e  reason is  t h a t  no new c o n t r a c t  y e t  has  been 
awarded i n  the t e c h n i c a l  a r eas  involved. These da ta  a r e  b iased  somewhat 
by inc luding  sole-source awards i n  t h e  follow-on comparisons, even though 
they were excluded i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  study. 
follow-ons t h e  win record was 22 out  of 30 awards f o r  an o v e r a l l  cap ture  
r a t i o  of 73%. 
However, even i n  t h e  competi t ive 
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Summarizing t h e  E f f e c t  of Performance Problems on Follow-on 
We a r e  now ready t o  examine t h e  e f f e c t  of poor performance on t h e  
loss of R&D and production follow-on t o  the  o r i g i n a l  government con t r ac t -  
i n g  agency and t o  a l l  o t h e r  government agencies  (and indus t ry ) .  The Mann- 
Whitney U s t a t i s t i c a l  test was used wi th  t h e  fol lowing r e s u l t s :  
Table 16. Impact of P ro jec t  Performance on Follow-ons 
Schedule Problems 
1. Serious problems cause loss of expected d i r e c t  R&D follow-on 
(U = 11, p = .009). 
2.  Ser ious  problems cause loss of expected d i r e c t  product ion 
follow-on (U = 10, p = .007). 
3. Serious problems cause no s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on 
win-loss  r a t i o  o r  number of c o n t r a c t s  won i n  s i m i l a r  t e c h n i c a l  
a r e a s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  government agencies .  
Cost Pro b 1 e m s  
1. Ser ious  problems cause loss of expected d i r e c t  R&D follow-on 
(U = 18, p = .087). 
2. Serious problems cause loss of expected d i r e c t  product ion 
follow-on (U = 12, p = .023). 
3. Serious problems cause no s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on 
win-loss  r a t i o o r  number of c o n t r a c t s  won i n  s i m i l a r  t e c h n i c a l  
a r e a s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  government agencies .  
Technical Performance Problems 
1. Serious problems cause loss of expected d i r e c t  R&D follow-on 
(U = 13, p = .063). 
2. Ser ious  problems cause loss of expected d i r e c t  product ion follow- 
on (U F 8, p = ,012). 
Ser ious  problems cause no s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on 
win-loss r a t i o  o r  number of c o n t r a c t s  won i n  s i m i l a r  t e c h n i c a l  
a r e a s  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  government agencies .  
3. 
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I n  add i t ion ,  t he  a n a l y s i s  d id  i n d i c a t e  (though not  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i -  
f i c a n t  a t  t h e  .10 l e v e l )  t h a t  t h e  l ack  of s e r i o u s  problems tended t o  
c o r r e l a t e  wi th  a l a r g e r  win-loss r a t i o  f o r  c o n t r a c t s  awarded by o t h e r  
government agencies  . 
Conclusions 
An i n v e s t i g a t i o n  was made using ques t ionna i r e  data on proposal  pre-  
pa ra t ion  dec i s ions ,  con t r ac t  performance, and follow-on procurements i n  
18 cases  of o r i g i n a l  R&D new business  awards. 
ing men a r e  a b l e  t o  p r e d i c t  t he  gene ra l  l i ke l ihood  of l a t e r  R&D follow-on 
con t r ac t s  more accu ra t e ly  than they can p r e d i c t  production follow-ons. 
However, except f o r  t h e  t r i v i a l  cases  i n  which it i s  c l e a r  t h a t  no follow- 
on p o t e n t i a l  e x i s t s ,  t h e  d o l l a r  magnitude of t h e  r e s u l t i n g  follow-on 
c o n t r a c t s  cannot be predic ted  e f f e c t i v e l y .  
t hese  p r e d i c t i o n s  cons idera t ion  of t h e  p o t e n t i a l  follow-on appears  t o  
s t rong ly  a f f e c t  a spec t s  of t he  o r i g i n a l  R&D proposals ,  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
con t r ac t s .  
It was found t h a t  market- 
Despi te  t h e  unce r t a in ty  of 
In  t h e  R&D p r o j e c t s  s tud ied  t h e  t h r e e  performance measures of 
schedule ,  c o s t ,  and t echn ica l  performance a r e  h igh ly  i n t e r c o r r e l a t e d .  
The g r e a t e s t  performance problems i n  a l l  t h r e e  a r e a s  a rose  i n  those  con- 
t r a c t  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  which the  o r i g i n a l  expec ta t ions  f o r  d i r e c t  follow-ons 
were h i g h e s t .  
t o  have w r i t t e n  i n i t i a l  R&D proposals  wi th  u n r e a l i s t i c  t i m e  schedules ,  cos t  
e s t ima tes ,  and t e c h n i c a l  performance goa ls .  The problems t h a t  were c rea t ed  
by not meeting t h e s e  three-dimensional goa ls  have caused loss of expected 
d i r e c t  follow-on c o n t r a c t s  i n  both R&D and production a r e a s .  
The companies t h a t  a n t i c i p a t e d  l a r g e  follow-ons thus  appear 
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Yet it seems t h a t  o t h e r  government agencies  e i t h e r  do not check t o o  
c l o s e l y  i n t o  t h e  pas t  performance of t h e  company o r  a r e  no t  adversely 
a f f e c t e d  by performance problems i n  c o n t r a c t s  performed f o r  o t h e r  agencies .  
The o the r  agencies  appear t o  be i n t e r e s t e d  only i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  com- 
pany has experience i n  the t e c h n i c a l  a r e a .  This  i s  suggested by t h e  f a r  
higher  win r a t i o  gene ra l ly  achieved by t h e  companies i n  follow-on a r e a s  
than i n  t h e  a r e a s  of o r i g i n a l  competit ion s tud ied  e a r l i e r .  Thus i n  de- 
c id ing  whether o r  no t  t o  "promise t h e  moon" i n  a new business proposal,  
R&D con t r ac to r s  need t o  balance t h e  p o t e n t i a l  loss of some of t h e  ex- 
pected d i r e c t  follow-on from the  government agency awarding t h e  i n i t i a l  
c o n t r a c t  a g a i n s t  t h e  increased business  p o t e n t i a l  t h a t  becomes a v a i l a b l e  
from o t h e r  government organizat ions once t h e  i n i t i a l  c o n t r a c t  work i s  
performed. This s i t u a t i o n  appears t o  be un fo r tuna te  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t s  of  
both government and e f f e c t i v e  i n d u s t r i a l  c o n t r a c t o r s .  
a b l e  t h a t  good R&D performance be more c o n s i s t e n t l y  rewarded and poor per- 
formance more c o n s i s t e n t l y  penalized by t h e  follow-on process.  
It would be d e s i r -  
Appendix--Questionnaire 
I -  
FORM A (WON) FOLLOW-UP ON SOLICITED COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENTS 
Company 
Respondent Title 
RFP No. Company Internal Proj . No. 
RFP Title 
Technica 1 Area 
Contracting Agency 
Bid Price $ 
Original Contract Form 
Form of Final Contract (Please check if renegotiated) CPFF ; 
Award Price $ 
CPIF ; Fixed Price; Fixed Price 
(Incentive) ; Cost Sharing ; Other (please explain) 
I. Project History (If project is not completed, estimate answers where 
applicable. Also please indicate here your current estimate of the 
percent of job now completed. 1 
1. What is the total amount received from this contract? $ 
How much growth does this figure include? 
In Scope $ Beyond Scope $ 
Original Negotiated Profit $ 
Final Negotiated Profit $ 
2.  What was the originally contracted completion date? 
What was the actual completion date? If different, 
what reasons for contract extensions? 
1. 
2 .  
3 .  
4 .  
continuation of effort 
expansion 
technical problems 
other (specify please) 
-A2 - 
3. Were t h e  t e c h n i c a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  of t h e  con t r ac t  a l t e r e d  s i g n i f i -  
c a n t l y  dur ing  t h e  l i f e  of t h e  c o n t r a c t ?  Yes- No- 
How, i n  genera l?  
4. Was t h e  head of t h e  proposal team made p r o j e c t  manager? Yes No 
If no t ,  who was made p ro jec t  manager? 
name t i t l e  
Was he on t h e  proposal team? Yes No- 
5.  On a s c a l e  from 1 t o  5, i n d i c a t e  your problems i n  t h e  fol lowing a r e a s .  
Schedule 
1 2 3 4 5 
problems prob 1 ems 
not  s i g n i f i c a n t  were c r u c i a l  
c o s t  
1 2 3 4 5 
prob 1 ems problems 
not s i g n i f i c a n t  were c r u c i a l  
Technical performance 
1 2 3 4 5 
not  s i g n i f i c a n t  were c r u c i a l  
prob 1 e m s  pr  ob 1 ems 
6. Explain t h e  na tu re  of the  problem i n  t h e  a r e a s  f o r  which you c i r c l e d  
4 o r  5 f o r  t he  previous ques t ion .  
-A3 - 
11. I n  o t d e r  t o  l e a r n  more about t h e  e f f e c t  of winning t h i s  c o n t r a c t  on your 
subsequent bidding,  we should l i k e  t o  know f i r s t  t h e  iamediate  follow-ons 
coming d i r e c t l y  from t h i s  cont rac t  and second your bidding a c t i v i t y  wi th in  
t h e  same gene ra l  t e c h n i c a l  area as covered by t h i s  con t r ac t .  
1. What has  been t h e  t o t a l  d o l l a r  volume of d i r e c t  R&D follow-on from 
t h i s  procurement t o  t h e  same agency: 
so f a r  $ expected i n  next  four  yea r s  $ 
2 .  What has  been t h e  t o t a l  d o l l a r  volume of d i r e c t  product ion follow-on 
from t h i s  procurement t o  the  same agency: 
so f a r  $ expected i n  next four  yea r s  $ 
3. Taking a l l  t h e  agencies  toge ther ,  p l ease  answer t h e  fol lowing ques t ions  
about a l l  t he  con t r ac t  oppor tun i t i e s  t h a t  you f e e l  t o  be follow-ons 
t o  t h i s  procurement. 
a .  How many follow-on procurements were conducted? R&D 9 
Product ion 
b. Number of sole-source awards t o  you 
c. Number competi t ive s o l i c i t e d  proposals  Number Won 
d. Number u n s o l i c i t e d  proposals submitted Number Won 
4. Break down your bidding i n  t h e  a rea  by agency (e.g., NASA-LRC, USAF-ESD, 
USA-Edgewood A r s . )  
Agency 1. 
No. Procurements 
Bid 
No Bid 
Won 
Lost 
$ Won 
$ Bid but Lost 
$ Bid but  no Award 
Agency 2.  Agency 3. 
'I% 
A l l  Other 
